This paper studies a class of dynamic voluntary contribution games in a setting with discounting and neoclassical payoffs (differentiable, strictly concave in the public good, and quasilinear in the private good). An achievable pro le is the limit point of a subgame perfect equilibrium path -the ultimate cumulative contribution vector of the players. A pro le is shown to be achievable only if it is in the undercore of the underlying coalitional game, i.e., the pro le cannot be blocked by a coalition using a component-wise smaller pro le. Conversely, if free-riding incentives are strong enough that contributing zero is a dominant strategy in the stage games, then any undercore pro le is the limit of achievable pro les as the period length shrinks. Thus, in this case when the period length is very short, (i) the set of achievable contributions does not depend on whether the players can move simultaneously or only in a round-robin fashion; (ii) an ef cient pro le can be approximately achieved if and only if it is in the core of the underlying coalitional game; and (iii) any achievable pro le can be achieved almost instantly.
Introduction
De ne a "dynamic voluntary contribution game" to be a multistage game in which players contribute amounts of a private good to a public project in multiple periods. The contributions are utilized by the project to produce future public bene ts. Familiar examples include a fund drive, or a never-ending sequence of fund drives, to nance university buildings, public radio programs, or a presidential campaign. Contributions may take the form of effort or produced inputs, such as the program modules contributed to an open source software project.
Being able to contribute in multiple periods may alleviate the free-rider problem. For example, in the settings considered in Marx and Matthews (2000) , equilibria with positive contributions exist if and only if the number of periods in which the players can contribute is suf ciently large. Some of these equilibria achieve ef cient outcomes in the limit as the discount factor goes to one. The logic of the result is simple: a player is induced to contribute in early periods because doing so induces others to contribute in future periods. The amount a player contributes in a period must be small so that the others will want to contribute later, which implies that contributions must be made piecemeal over time. The necessity of such "strategic gradualism" has been demonstrated in several related papers, most generally in Compte and Jehiel (2004) .
Most of the literature on dynamic contribution focuses on technologies with "threshold provision points," which are aggregate contribution levels at which the produced public good discontinuously increases. (The typical example is a binary project like the building of a bridge.)
Because of the discontinuity, once the cumulative contribution is suf ciently close to the nal threshold, each player's best reply is to contribute enough to achieve the threshold. Accordingly, backwards induction arguments can be used to characterize equilibria, and equilibrium contributions are raised in only a nite number of periods. This roughly describes much of Admati and Perry (1991) , Gale (1995) , Marx and Matthews (2000) , Compte and Jehiel (2003) , Choi, Gale, and Kariv (2006) , Yildirim (2006) , and Duffy, Ochs, and Vesterlund (2007) .
Thresholds are absent, however, in many settings. This is true of a public project with a neoclassical production function, i.e., one that is strictly increasing and concave. With an in nite contributing horizon and no threshold, backwards induction cannot be used. Only a few studies of no-threshold games have appeared. Using a discounting payoff criterion, Marx and Matthews (2000) , Lockwood and Thomas (2002) , and Pitchford and Snyder (2004) study rather special cases of no-threshold games, showing the existence of equilibria in which contributions are made in nitely often, and which are approximately ef cient if the discount factor is close to one. Gale (2001) shows that such games without discounting have fully ef cient equilibria. This paper provides a more complete study of no-threshold, in nite-horizon contribution games with discounting. The goal is to characterize the nature of all equilibrium contribution pro les and payoffs, with an emphasis on distributional as well as ef ciency aspects.
Overview of Results
In each period of the games studied in this paper, some players can contribute private good to a public project. Every player is able to move in nitely often, but not necessarily each period.
Contributions are irreversible, do not depreciate, and are publicly observed. The project uses the sum of all past contributions to produce a ow of public good. Each player maximizes the discounted sum of her stage-game payoffs. For simplicity and to facilitate comparisons, each player's stage-game payoff function is assumed to be differentiable, quasilinear in the player's private good, and strictly concave in the sum of past contributions currently used to provide public good. The concavity eliminates thresholds.
Attention is restricted to pure strategy subgame perfect equilibria. Any equilibrium generates a nondecreasing path of cumulative contribution pro les. A contribution pro le is achievable if it is the limit point of an equilibrium path. A pro le is ef cient if it is Pareto optimal for the stage-game payoff functions. Thus, an outcome path is ef cient if and only if it achieves an ef cient pro le immediately, in the rst period possible. We shall see that discounting precludes ef ciency. The goal is to characterize the set of achievable pro les and equilibrium payoffs, especially for large discount factors.
The characterizations are in terms of an underlying coalitional game. The notion of "blocking" in this game re ects two features of the dynamic game. First, since every pro le on an equilibrium path of the dynamic game must lie below the contribution pro le the path achieves, a coalition should only be able to use a smaller pro le to block the achieved pro le. I thus de ne a pro le to be underblocked by a coalition if there exists a smaller pro le that each coalition member prefers, and which prescribes zero contributions for the nonmembers. Second, since a player in the dynamic game can raise her contribution any amount whenever she is able to move, blocking is de ned using the payoffs the players can obtain by unilaterally raising their contribution from the blocking pro le.
The undercore is the set of pro les that are not underblocked. Thus, an undercore pro le does not require any coalition to contribute a disproportionately large amount. The undercore is typically a strict subset of the individually rational pro les, if there are more than two players.
The undercore contains the familiar core, the set of pro les that are not blocked by the usual de nition. Indeed, the core is precisely the set of ef cient pro les in the undercore.
The rst main result is that all achievable pro les are in the undercore. Thus, no coalition can be induced to contribute too much. If the limit of a sequence of achievable pro les is an ef cient pro le, it must be in the core. Since the undercore (core) is typically a strict subset of the individually rational (and ef cient) pro les, this is an "anti-folk-theorem" result. 1 The second main result is a partial converse of the rst: almost any contribution pro le in the undercore is achievable if the period length is short enough. Moreover, there is a xed sequence of pro les converging to the given undercore pro le that is an equilibrium path for all small period lengths. This result is obtained under two further assumptions. The rst is a weak cyclicity assumption on the move structure satis ed, e.g., by the simultaneous and round-robin structures. The second additional assumption is that the payoffs satisfy the prisoners' dilemma property that in any stage game, not contributing more is a dominant strategy for each player. This is the case in which free riding incentives are strongest.
When both results obtain, the set of achievable contribution pro les converges to the undercore as the period length goes to zero. An ef cient pro le can be attained in the limit if and only if it is in the core. This is true regardless of whether players can contribute simultaneously each period, or only in a round robin fashion.
The nature of the pro le an equilibrium path achieves is, of course, unimportant for payoffs when the convergence is very slow. However, since an achievable pro le can be achieved by the same equilibrium path for all small period lengths, the real time required to get close to the achieved pro le is negligible when the period length is very small. Thus, in the limit any achievable pro le can be achieved in a "twinkling of the eye". Although strategic gradualism is necessary (if the achieved pro le is non-autarchic) in the sense that the convergence must be asymptotic, it does not necessarily generate signi cant inef ciency if the period length is very short. An ef cient payoff is the limit of equilibrium payoffs if and only if it is a payoff generated by a pro le in the core.
Relationship to the Literature
The dynamic voluntary contribution games of this paper correspond to the "monotone games with positive spillovers" of Gale (2001) . The main difference is that a payoff in the latter is not a discounted sum of the stage-game payoffs, but is instead their limit. The stage-game payoff functions in Gale (2001) are more general than those of this paper, being de ned on Euclidian spaces of arbitrary dimension and assumed only to be continuous, exhibit positive spillovers, 1 The folk theorem of Dutta (1995) for stochastic games does not apply here because its "asymptotic state independence" assumptions, (A1) and (A2), are not satis ed. and satisfy a boundedness property. The main result is that any "strongly minimal positive satiation point" is, in this paper's terminology, achievable. The demonstration in this paper that almost any undercore pro le is achievable if the period length is short enough extends Gale's no-discounting result to a class of games with discounting.
As in this paper, Lockwood and Thomas (2002) also consider dynamic contribution games with discounting and no thresholds. They restrict attention to two-player games, with symmetric payoff functions that exhibit the prisoners' dilemma property that each player's payoff decreases in her own contribution. When the payoffs are differentiable, the pro le achieved by the most ef cient symmetric equilibrium is shown to be inef cient, and to achieve an inef ciently small pro le. In this paper the analogous result is obtained for any equilibrium. As the discount factor goes to one, Lockwood and Thomas (2002) show that the most ef cient symmetric equilibrium converges to an ef cient equilibrium. Pitchford and Snyder (2004) obtain a similar result. These asymptotic results foreshadow the suf ciency result of this paper, that any undercore (and hence core) pro le is achievable in the limit as the period length shrinks to zero. Lockwood and Thomas (2002) also study their model with "linear kinked payoffs" as in Marx and Matthews (2000) . The related result they obtain in this case is that the most ef cient symmetric equilibrium payoff of the simultaneous move game can be attained also in the alternating move game, in the limit as discounting is taken to zero. This result about the irrelevancy of the move structure foreshadows that of this paper.
Lastly, Bagnoli and Lipman (1989) study the connection between the core of a public goods coalitional game and the equilibrium outcomes of a dynamic game. The public good is discrete, which creates a sequence of thresholds. The main result is the design of a dynamic game, without discounting, that fully implements the core, given an equilibrium re nement criterion combining trembling-hand perfection with successive elimination of dominated strategies. The designed game differs from the usual voluntary contribution game by having a "contribution collector" who proportionately refunds the contribution amounts each period that exceed the largest threshold point that has been reached, and who stops the game and produces the public good once the new contributions in some period are too small to reach the next threshold.
Organization
The games to be studied are described in Section 2, and preliminary results in Section 3. Section 4 is devoted to the coalitional game. Sections 5 and 6 contain the main results, necessary and suf cient conditions for a pro le to be achievable. Summarizing theorems are in Section 7, and conclusions in Section 8. Appendices A E contain proofs.
Dynamic Contribution Games
This section contains descriptions of the games to be considered, scenarios from which they arise, and lastly the smoothness assumptions.
Game Description
The set of players is N D f1; : : : ; ng; with n 2: In each stage game, player i will choose a (cumulative) contribution, x i 2 R C . Given a contribution pro le x 2 R 
where u : R n C ! R n is the stage-game payoff function and 2 .0; 1/ is the discount factor.
The stage-game payoffs take the form
Each valuation function v i satis es v i .0/ D 0; and other assumptions made below.
The game is monotone in the sense that x t x t 1 for each t 0 is required. 2 The move structure is a sequence E N D fN t g 1 tD1 of nonempty subsets of players. Only players in N t can raise their contributions in period t: Thus, x t i D x t 1 i for all i = 2 N t is also required. A feasible path is one that satis es these two requirements.
Each player is able to move in nitely often: [ t N D N for all t 1: Past contributions are publicly observed. The extensive form game thus de ned is denoted 0. ; E N /:
Contribution Scenarios
The game 0. ; E N / arises from at least two simple contribution scenarios. 3 In the rst one, the players contribute private good over multiple periods, but consume only at the end of the game. If it ends in period t; the utility of player i is O u i . f .x t /; ! i x t i /; where f .x t / is the public good produced, ! i is the player's private good endowment, and O u i is the player's utility function for the two goods. The date at which the game ends is a random variable T satisfying 2 Here, x x 0 means x i x 0 i for all iI x > x 0 means x 6 D x 0 and x x 0 I and x x 0 means x i > x 0 i for all i: 3 Games similar to 0. ; E N / arise also in other, contribution-like settings, such as those in Pitchford and Snyder (2004) , Park (2004), and Zissimos (2007) .
Pr.T D t/ D t 1 .1 / for any t 1 : conditional on the game having not ended before date t;
it ends then with probability 1 : This random "breakdown" is an external friction that serves both to make the game well-de ned and to give teeth to subgame perfection, familiar from the sequential bargaining literature, and used in the related model of Pitchford and Snyder (2004) .
In this rst scenario, a player's expected utility from a path E x is as shown in (1), with
If the produced public good depends only on the aggregate contribution, and the payoffs take the quasilinear form 
where r is her discount rate and D e r 1 : A path E x gives her the payoff
As desired, this payoff is the same as (1) and (2), letting
In upcoming sections the valuation function v i is held xed while taking since that bene t is received in every future period. In this scenario there is no free rider problem when the discount rate is very small.
Smoothness Assumptions
The valuation functions are assumed to be continuously differentiable, strictly increasing, and strictly concave in X: These are the neoclassical assumptions of perfect divisibility, monotonic convex preferences, and decreasing returns in public good production.
Because v i is strictly increasing, the following positive spillover property holds:
In order to insure nontriviality, the following assumption is also maintained:
The rst inequality ensures that P i2N v i .X / X; the sum of the players' payoffs, has a maximizer. This ef cient aggregate contribution is unique, and denoted as Y N . The second inequality in (3) implies Y N > 0:
The above assumptions are maintained throughout the paper. In contrast, at times it will be useful to assume that v 0 i .0/ 1 for all i 2 N . This assumption is equivalent, given the strict concavity of each v i ; to the following prisoners' dilemma property:
When (PD) holds, each player's dominant strategy in any stage game, regardless of the history, is to not raise her contribution. Free-riding incentives are the strongest in this case. Much of the related literature, e.g., Lockwood and Thomas (2002) and Pitchford and Snyder (2004) , is exclusively concerned with payoffs that satisfy (PD).
Equilibrium Paths and Achievable Pro les
We restrict attention to pure strategy subgame perfect equilibria, henceforth referred to simply as "equilibria". Each one gives rise to an equilibrium path. The limit of an equilibrium path is an achievable pro le. This section contains initial observations about these objects. Missing proofs are in Appendix A. Starting from a pro le x; the maximal payoff player i could obtain by raising her contribution, when the others do not raise theirs, is
Denoting this maximizing contribution as b i .x/; it is given by
Note that u is continuous, and that it satis es the following positive spillover and weak prisoners' dilemma properties:
Any pro le x for which u.x/ u .0/ is individually rational. It is strictly individually
Any pro le x for which u .x/ D u.x/ is a satiation pro le (Gale, 2001) . A satiation pro le here is one for which X N Y :
Equilibrium Paths
As usual, a central construct for subgame perfection is the continuation payoff that player i receives in period t from a path E x :
Note that this is a convex combination of the player's present and future stage-game payoffs.
We now derive two conditions that equilibrium continuation payoffs and paths must satisfy.
The conditions are based on the observation that after any history, a player can always choose to never raise her contribution again. Refer to this as her passive strategy. Because of (PS), the worst conceivable punishment the other players can impose upon a deviator is to play their passive strategies thereafter.
Suppose player i deviates from an equilibrium path E x to her passive strategy in period t: If the others maximally punish her by subsequently playing their passive strategies, the deviation yields a degenerate path E z in which z s D .x
The outcome of this strategy pro le is E x; and it is clearly a Nash equilibrium if E x satis es (6).
A passive trigger Nash equilibrium need not be subgame perfect, since the passive strategy pro le is not an equilibrium of any subgame that starts from a pro le with an aggregate less than N Y : In such a subgame, some player's best reply to the passive strategies is to raise the aggregate to her Y i as soon as possible. However, no subgame of this type exists if (PD) holds, as then N Y D 0; and a passive trigger equilibrium is subgame perfect. Therefore, (6) is suf cient for a feasible path to be an equilibrium path when (PD) holds. Since (5) then implies (6), its necessity allows us to conclude that (5) is both necessary and suf cient in this case. This proves the following lemma.
Lemma 1. Any equilibrium path satisfies (5) and (6). If (PD) holds, then any feasible path is an equilibrium path if and only if it satisfies (5).
Remark 1. If (PD) is weakened to the assumption that
sufficient for a feasible path to be an equilibrium path. The proof of this uses strategies that require a unilateral deviator, whose deviation yields an aggregate O X < N Y ; to alone raise O X to N Y :
is not robust to perturbations of the valuation functions. This generalization is, therefore, not pursued here.
The next lemma establishes that every equilibrium path converges, and that its limit is a satiation pro le. The convergence is asymptotic if the aggregate is strictly larger than N Y :
Lemma 2. Every equilibrium path converges to a satiation profile. The convergence does not occur in finite time if the limiting profile satisfies X > N Y :
A pro le x is achievable in 0. ; E N / if it is the limit of one of its equilibrium paths. The main results of the paper concern the set of achievable pro les.
Achievable Pro les
Solo pro les are often achievable. A routine argument shows that the payoff generated by an achieved pro le x is the limit of the continuation payoffs along any path E x that achieves it:
This convergence may be non-monotonic, since a player's stage-game payoff may decrease when she raises her contribution. However, the next lemma implies that any payoff setback is temporary. The payoff generated by the achieved pro le exceeds each stage-game payoff and each continuation payoff.
Lemma 3. Suppose x is achieved by an equilibrium path E x: Then u .x s / u.x/ for each s 0; and hence U t .E x; / u.x/ for each t 0:
Any achievable pro le is individually rational, as is veri ed by setting t D 0 in Lemma 3 to
The following lemma establishes a stronger result.
Lemma 4. Any non-solo achievable profile is strictly individually rational.
The Coalitional Game
This section concerns the underlying coalitional game that will be used to characterize achievable pro les. Missing proofs are in Appendix B.
Blocking, Underblocking, and the Undercore
The coalitional game re ects two features of the dynamic game. First, recall that when a player is able to deviate from an equilibrium path E x; she can insure that her continuation payoff is at
When considering whether to block a pro le by implementing on its own an alternative pro le, a coalition should therefore evaluate the alternative using u : Hence, letting a coalition be a nonempty subset of players, de ne a pro le x to be blocked by a coalition S using a pro le z if and only if z S D 0 and u S .z/ > u S .x/: The set of unblocked pro les is the core, denoted as C:
The second relevant feature of the dynamic game is that a player can only deviate from a pro le on the equilibrium path, and this path lies below the pro le it achieves. We are thus interested in whether an achieved pro le can be blocked from a pro le that lies below it. Accordingly, de ne a pro le x to be underblocked by a coalition S if it blocks x using a pro le z x: The set of pro les that are not underblocked is the undercore, denoted as D:
An underblocked pro le is blocked. The core is thus a subset of the undercore: C D:
Since every core pro le is Pareto ef cient (with respect to u/; we see that the undercore contains some ef cient pro les. The following lemma shows that the undercore also contains the solo pro les, and that it itself is contained in the set of individually rational satiation pro les.
Lemma 5. .i/ Any solo profile is in the undercore. .ii/ Any undercore profile is an individually rational satiation profile.
Familiar de nitions are needed to derive the structure of the undercore. For any coalition S;
denotes the sum of the coalition members' payoffs if they contribute X and non-members contribute zero. Our assumptions imply f S has a unique maximizer, to be denoted as Y S : (Let
Proposition 1. The undercore is the set of satiation profiles satisfying, for all coalitions S;
Equivalently, the undercore is the set of satiation profiles satisfying, for all coalitions S;
If a pro le x satis es the second inequality in (7), it gives the coalition S a total payoff that is not less than the maximal payoff it could obtain on its own. In this case S cannot block x, and hence cannot underblock it either. When x satis es the rst inequality in (7), it requires S to contribute an amount smaller than Y S : In this case, if S can block x; it can do so only by using a larger contribution, z S > x S ; and so it again cannot underblock x:
From (8) we see that the undercore is the set of satiation pro les satisfying a number of inequalities, each of which bounds a coalition's contribution. This is a "balance" requirement.
Like a core pro le, an undercore pro le must not ask any coalition to contribute more than a certain amount that, in this case, is a nondecreasing function of X:
The inequalities determining the undercore are less restrictive for pro les with smaller aggregates. For example, from (7) we see that if x is a satiation pro le satisfying X < Y S for every non-singleton coalition, then x 2 D if and only if it is individually rational. However, if
The set of such undercore pro les is the core, as part .ii/ of the following corollary shows. It refers to the coalition that a pro le x requires to contribute, N .x/ :D fi 2 N : x i > 0g: 
Note that D is a strict subset of the set of individually rational satiation profiles. The core is the subset of D for which X D 9; and can be written as C D x 2 R 3 C : X D 9; 1 x i 5 :
Undercore Payoffs
In the next section, only undercore pro les will be shown to be achievable. This is a restrictive result for payoffs only if the set of undercore payoffs, u.D/; is not equal to the entire set of individually rational feasible payoffs,
We have u.D/ R: The following corollary shows that this inclusion is strict so long as a non-singleton, non-grand coalition has a positive value, as is typically true if n > 2.
Corollary 2. If a coalition S exists such that 1 < jSj < n and V .S/ > 0; then Rnu.D/ contains a nonempty open set of payoffs.
Denote the set of payoffs that are ef cient and individually rational as
Under the hypothesis of Corollary 2 , a similar (omitted) proof shows that Pnu.C/ contains a nonempty, relatively open set. Thus, in this case not all payoffs that are ef cient and individually rational are core payoffs. This is true for the example above.
Example 1 (con't). These sets of payoffs in Example 1 are
Note that u.D/ is a strict subset of R; and u.C/ is a strict subset of
the subset of P generated by the pro les x 0 that are ef cient and individually rational. Lastly, we note for future reference that because the core is equal to the set of ef cient subset of the undercore, u.C/ P \ u.D/: As the reverse is also true, 6 we have
Weak Underblocking A related notion of underblocking will allow somewhat sharper results. A coalition S will be said to weakly underblock a pro le x if a pro le z < x exists such that z S D 0 and
This de nition differs from that of underblocking in two ways: z cannot equal x; and the coalition members can be indifferent in the sense that
The following lemma records two simple facts. Any pro le that is not weakly underblocked is strictly individually rational if it is nonzero, and it is in the undercore if it is a satiation pro le. 5 The larger set P contains payoffs like u.5; 5; 0/ .1:325; 1:325; 6:325/; since x D .5; 5; 0/ is ef cient and individually rational. 
Necessary Conditions for Achievability
This section contains two results: any achievable pro le is in the undercore, and it is inef cient.
Required proofs are in Appendix C.
It is perhaps surprising that an achievable pro le must be in the undercore. Indeed, if a coalition S underblocks x using z; and a path E x converging to x is being played, at some point each coalition member would be better off if they all deviated to z S : But how can they manage to coordinate thier actions in this way? The answer lies in the dynamics, and the fact that z is below x: In some period the path E x will move into the region above z: Some coalition member i must be pivotal for this movement, so that x The precise statement of this result is the following proposition. The proof of part .i/ is a sharpening of the argument just outlined. Part .ii/ is the simple statement that any achievable pro le is in the undercore, and it follows from part .i/. If an achievable pro le is solo, it is in the undercore for that reason. If it is not solo, then it is a strictly individually rational satiation pro le by Lemmas 2 and 4, and so part .i/ and Lemma 6 imply it is in the undercore.
Proposition 2. .i/ Any strictly individually rational achievable profile is not weakly underblocked, and is hence in the undercore. .ii/ Every achievable profile is in the undercore.
Remark 2. The proof of part .i/ of Proposition 2 uses only that achievable profiles satisfy (6) (from Lemma 1), that achievable profiles are satiation profiles (from Lemma 2), and that undercore profiles are satiation profiles (from Lemma 6). The only payoff assumption the proofs of these parts of these lemmas use is (PS), positive spillovers. Part .i/ of Proposition 2 is thus true for fairly general payoffs: for any u : R n C ! R n satisfying (PS) and for which u is well defined, the undercore contains all achievable profiles that are strictly individually rational.
Proposition 2 leaves open the possibility that an ef cient pro le can be achieved. This possibility is eliminated by the following proposition.
Proposition 3. Any achievable x is inefficient. In particular, it is either a solo profile, or it is inefficient for the contributing coalition: X < Y N .x/ :
A heuristic argument conveys the logic of the proof of Proposition 3. Consider an equilibrium path E x that achieves x; with X > N Y : To the rst order, the date t increase in the equilibrium aggregate, C t :D X t X t 1 ; increases the present value of the surplus of the contributing players in periods s t C 1 by
The share of M B received by player i must, since she is willing to increase x 
We thus have M B MC min : Taking X t 1 ! X in this inequality yields
Since X > N Y ; the right and hence the left side of this inequality is positive: the marginal social bene t of increasing the aggregate remains positive in the limit. Hence, X < Y N .x/ :
Remark 3. Achievable profiles may be efficient if payoffs are not differentiable. Suppose each marginal valuation v 0 i is positive until it drops to zero at an efficient aggregate amount X that "completes the project" Then, if is large, equilibrium paths may exist for which X t ! X :
See Marx and Matthews (2000) and Lockwood and Thomas (2002) .
Suf cient Conditions for Achievability
In this section a near converse to Proposition 2 is established: virtually any undercore pro le can be achieved if the period length is suf ciently small. Missing proofs are in Appendix D.
The result is obtained under two further assumptions, made to deal with two dif culties caused by discounting. The rst one, already discussed, is that a discounting player may want to deviate in a period by contributing too much, e.g., to raise her contribution to Y i immediately rather than to wait for others to do so in the future. In this case a passive trigger Nash equilibrium may fail to be subgame perfect. This problem is now avoided by assuming (PD). It allows us, by
Lemma 1, to focus on equilibrium paths rather than strategies: a feasible path E x is an equilibrium path if and only if it satis es (5).
The second dif culty caused by discounting is that a future reward can in uence current behavior only if it is not received too far in the future. As this must be true at any date, the interval between the times at which the players can move should not grow too quickly as the game progresses. The following cyclicity property ensures this:
(CY) integer m > 0 exists such that i 2 N .nkCi/m for all i 2 N and k 0: Accordingly, player 1 is able to move at date m; player 2 at date 2m; and so on until the pattern repeats with player 1 able to move at date .n C 1/m: There are no restrictions on who else can move at dates that are multiples of m; nor on who can move at any other date. Familiar move structures satisfy (CY). With m D 1; it is satis ed by both the simultaneous move structure and the round-robin structure de ned by N R t :D ft mod n C 1g: The following lemma establishes that for any E N satisfying (CY), any equilibrium path of the round-robin game passes through the same pro les as does an equilibrium path of a game that has the move structure E N and a certain weakly greater discount factor. This result will allow us to restrict attention to the round-robin structure.
Lemma 8. Suppose (PD) holds, E N satisfies (CY), and E x is feasible for E N R : Then a path E z exists that passes through the same profiles as does E x; and has the property that for any 2 .0; 1/; it is an equilibrium path of 0.
1=m ; E N / if E x is an equilibrium path of 0. ; E N R /:
The path E z in Lemma 8 is obtained by slowing down the the round-robin path E x: player 1 moves in period m instead of period 1; player 2 moves in period 2m instead of period 2; and so on. Property (CY) insures that this new path is feasible for E N : Along this new path the future reward a player receives for raising her contribution in the current period is postponed, but it is received for enough periods that raising the discount factor to 1=m increases its present value enough to restore incentives.
Given (PD), the necessary conditions obtained in Propositions 2 and 3 reduce to the following: an achievable pro le must be inef cient for the contributing coalition, and it must not be weakly underblocked. If E N satis es (CY), the following proposition shows that these conditions are suf cient as well as necessary, for large discount factors.
Proposition 4. Suppose (PD) holds and E N satisfies (CY). Let x be a profile that is not weakly underblocked and satisfies X < Y N .x/ : Then a path E x and a discount factor < 1 exist such that E x is an equilibrium path that achieves x for all > :
The following is an overview of the proof of Proposition 4. In light of Lemma 8, it only needs to be proved for the round-robin structure.
Given x; the proof begins be nding two pro les, N x and O x; that satisfy N x < O x < x and
These pro les exist because X < Y N .x/ . The pro le O x is chosen close enough to x that it too is not weakly underblocked. The proof then has three steps.
In
Step 1, an in nite round-robin path starting at N x and converging to x is constructed.
This path is a round-robin geometric sequence: each player raises her contribution the same proportional amount towards x when it is her turn to move. The increases are made small enough that u.x/ u.x t / is bounded above zero. This bound shrinks to zero over time, quickly enough that for all high discount factors, player i's equilibrium continuation payoff is close enough to u i .x/ that she is induced to raise her contribution in the current period. This step uses X < Y N .x/ and the concavity of each v i :
Step 2 uses the fact that O x is not weakly underblocked. Adapting an argument in Gale once the sequence is close enough to the origin, a player cannot lower her contribution enough to raise her payoff to u i . O x/:
Step 3 puts together the sequences obtained in Steps 1 and 2 to yield a path E x that converges to x and is feasible for E N R : At a date for which x t N x; the construction of Step 1 insures that the remainder of the path is an equilibrium path of the continuation game if is large. At a date for which x t < N x; u.x t / is bounded strictly below u.x/; and so again their continuation payoff from E x can be made large enough, by choosing large, that the players are induced to play x tC1 :
The path E x is thus an equilibrium path if is large enough.
Synthesis and Discussion
In this section results are put together and implications drawn. Proofs are in Appendix E.
Achievable Pro les
Denote the set of achievable pro les given a move structure E N as
The results of the previous sections relate the achievable pro les to the set
x is not weakly underblocked :
In words, D 0 consists of the solo pro les together with the satiation pro les that are not weakly underblocked, and which have an aggregate that is inef ciently small for the contributing coali- Most of Theorem 1 has been discussed already. Part (a) states that any achievable pro le is in the undercore. Therefore, any ef cient pro le that can be approximately achieved is in the core. Part (b) gives a full characterization of the set of achievable pro les when (PD) and (CY)
hold, and adds that its closure is then precisely the undercore.
A consequence of (b) is a move structure irrelevancy: when payoffs satis es (PD), all move structures that satisfy (CY) give rise to the same achievable pro les. In particular, no more pro les are achievable under the simultaneous structure than under the round-robin structure.
Note, however, that this is a limiting result obtained as ! 1I for a xed the set of achievable pro les generally does depend on the move structure.
The main result not included in Theorem 1 is that any achievable pro le x can be achieved, given (PD) and (CY), by the same equilibrium path for all large (Proposition 4). Thus, if we interpret a decrease in as a decrease in the period length 1, the amount of real time required for the path to enter any xed neighborhood of x goes to zero as 1 ! 0: Every undercore pro le can therefore be approximately achieved instantaneously in the limit. Although strategic gradualism is necessary in so far as pro les with X > N Y are achieved only asymptotically (Lemma 2), there is no upper bound on the speed of convergence as the period length shrinks.
Equilibrium Payoffs
The set of limits of equilibrium payoffs for a given move structure is
Since every payoff in this set is individually rational, the set of ef cient payoffs that are limits of equilibrium payoffs is P \ W . E N /. The relationship of this set to u.C/; the set of core payoffs, is established in the following theorem.
Theorem 2. Under the maintained assumptions,
Part .i/ of Theorem 2 establishes that any ef cient payoff that is approximated by equilibrium payoffs is a core payoff. Its proof is based on the observation that any achievable pro le is in the undercore (Proposition 2), and every equilibrium payoff is bounded above by the payoff of the achieved pro le (Lemma 3).
Part .ii/ establishes the converse for when (PD) and (CY) hold: every core payoff is then the limit of a sequence of equilibrium payoffs. Its proof uses the following stronger result.
Lemma 9. u.D/ W . E N / if (PD) and (CY) hold.
The proof of Lemma 9 uses the result of Proposition 4 that for almost any x 2 D (i.e., any
x 2 D 0 /; a path E x exists that converges to it and is an equilibrium path for all large : The path spends more and more time near x as the period length shrinks, and so the equilibrium payoff
The irrelevancy of the move structure for limits of payoffs is implied by Lemma 9 and, especially, Theorem 2 .ii/: Given (PD), the set of limiting equilibrium payoffs generated by any structure satisfying (CY) contains u.D/; and the set of ef cient limiting equilibrium payoffs is precisely u.C/: Neither of these sets depends on the move structure.
Conclusion
This paper has characterized the set of achievable contribution pro les and equilibrium payoffs of a certain class of dynamic voluntary contribution games with smooth, discounted payoffs.
The rst main result is that any achievable pro le must be in the undercore of the underlying coalitional game -no coalition can be induced to contribute too much. Unlike the folk theorem for repeated games, this result yields a restriction on the nature of equilibria that may be testable in the eld or laboratory. It is also a fairly general result, essentially holding for any payoff function satisfying the positive spillovers property (see Remark 2).
The converse is true in a limiting sense if payoffs satisfy the prisoners' dilemma property (PD), and the move structure satis es the cyclicity property (CY). Virtually any undercore prole is then achievable if the discount factor is large enough. All core pro les and payoffs are obtained in the limit, but not any other ef cient pro le or payoff. The limiting set of achievable pro les, and the set of ef cient limits of equilibrium payoffs, are the same for all move structures satisfying (CY), including the simultaneous and round-robin ones. Lastly, any achievable pro le can be achieved instantly in the limit as the period length shrinks to zero, implying an anti-gradualism result for payoffs.
The payoff assumptions used to obtain the second set of results are strong, even though commonly used. The role of (PD) Proof. Set s 1 D t: Let > t be the rst date larger than t such that i 2 N : Then
using Lemma 1 to obtain the third inequality. Since U i .E x; / is a convex combination of the set fu i .x s /g s> ; it is weakly exceeded by at least one of its elements. Hence, s 2 exists such
The desired sequence is obtained by iterating this construction.
Proof of Lemma 2. Let E x be an equilibrium path. Assume it does not converge. Then, as it is monotonic, X t ! 1:
X / X is strictly concave in X and has a nite maximizer, it diverges to 1 as X ! 1: Hence, u i .x t / ! 1 for some i 2 N : This implies fu i .x t /g t 0 does not have a nondecreasing subsequence, contrary to Lemma A1. Hence, E x converges. Let x be its limit.
To prove x is a satiation pro le, x i 2 N : At a date t such that i 2 N t ; Lemma 1 yields
Take the limit of both sides of this inequality along the unbounded sequence of dates t satisfying i 2 N t : Since u and u are continuous and x t ! x; its left side converges to u i .x/ and its right side to u.x/: Hence, u .x/ u.x/; and so x is a satiation pro le. Now suppose X > N Y : Assume E x converges to x at date T < 1 : x T 1 < x; and x s D x for s T: Let i be a player for whom x
If player i deviates to z i at date T and plays passively thereafter, her continuation payoff would be at least u i .z i ; x i /: This deviation payoff exceeds her equilibrium continuation payoff
contrary to subgame perfection. Thus, E x converges only asymptotically.
Proof of Lemma 3. Let t 0 and i 2 N : Let fs k g 1 kD1 be the sequence from Lemma A1. Then
since x is a satiation pro le by Lemma 2. So we now have u i .x s / u i .x s / u i .x/ for all s 0: From this, U t .E x; / u.x/ for any t 0 is immediate.
Proof of Lemma 4. Let x be an achievable pro le, and suppose u i .x/ D u i .0/ for some i 2 N :
We prove the lemma by showing x is solo.
Let E x be an equilibrium path that achieves x: Let be the rst date such that i 2 N : Then
where the rst inequality is due to (PS /; the second to Lemma 1, and the third to 
This proves x is solo.
Appendix B. Proofs Missing from Section 4
Recall that a coalition S underblocks x using z if u S .z/ > u S .x/; z x; and z S D 0: The coalition weakly underblocks x using z if u S .z/ u S .x/; z < x; and z S D 0: Lemma B1. Let x be a satiation pro le and S a coalition.
.i/ If S underblocks x; then z exists such that u S .z/ D u S .z/; and S underblocks x using z:
.ii/ If S weakly underblocks x and x is non-solo, then z exists such that u S .z/ D u S .z/; and S weakly underblocks x using z: 
The rst (second) implication shows that if S underblocks (weakly underblocks) x using O z; then it does so as well with z; so long as z x .z < x/; which we now show.
Suppose S underblocks x using O z: Then O z x; and we must prove z x: We already have
Now suppose x is non-solo and S weakly underblocks x using O z. Then O z < x; and we must prove z < x: The previous paragraph still yields z x:
a satiation pro le. Hence, x is solo. This contradiction proves z < x:
Lemma B2. A satiation pro le x is underblocked if and only if for some coalition S;
Proof. Suppose x is underblocked by a coalition S: Then by Lemma B1, z < x exists such that z S D 0 and u S .x/ < u S .z/: Summing these inequalities over S and using Z S D Z yields
This and Z X yield Z < X S : As f S .Z / V .S/; (11) also implies X S > P i2S v i .X / V .S/; which is half of (10). Now, note that X S X and (11) imply f S .X S / < f S .Z /: Thus, if X S Y S were true, the concavity of f S and Z < X S Y S would imply an impossibility,
This proves X S > Y S ; the other half of (10).
To prove the converse, suppose (10) holds for coalition S.
Furthermore,
De ne z 2 R n by z S D 0; and z i :
Proof of Proposition 1. By Lemma 5, D contains only satiation pro les. For a satiation pro le
x; Lemma B2 implies that x 2 D if and only if (10) does not hold for any S; i.e., if and only if
x satis es (8).
It is immediate that (7) implies (8), using X S X: Suppose x satis es (8). The rst case to
This inequality rearranges to
Hence, Y S > X; and x satis es the rst half of (7). The other case is
and so x satis es the second half of (7). This proves that (7) and (8) 
Proof of Corollary 2. Because V .S/ > 0; Y S > 0: This and jSj > 1 imply that for any i = 2 S; substituting i for any j 2 S yields a coalition O S of the same size as S for which
Let O be the set of pro les x 2 R n CC satisfying
The continuity " also satis es (13). Now, for
Thus, x satis es (14), and so x " does too if " is small. Hence, " > 0 exists such that weakly underblocks x: Then, since x is a non-solo satiation pro le, Lemma B1 .ii/ implies the existence of z < x such that z S D 0 and u S .x/ u S .z/: Sum these inequalities to obtain P
However, the strict concavity of each v i , together with Z < X Y N ; implies P ; x i / > u i .x/: Condition (6) thus fails to hold, and so E x is not an equilibrium path by Lemma 1. This contradiction proves x is not weakly underblocked. This and the fact that x is a satiation pro le imply x 2 D; by Lemma 6.
Lemma C1. If x is an achievable pro le in 0. ; E N /; and X > max i2N .x/ Y i ; then
Summing these inequalities over i 2 N .x/ and replacing
This rearranges, upon multiplying by 1 ; to
Using the identity .1 / P s t
Since X > O Y ; we have v 
Because X > O Y ; Lemma 2 implies E x converges to x asymptotically. 8 Thus, X t 1 < X: Proposition 2 implies x 2 D; and so X Y N .x/ by Corollary 1 .i/. Hence, X t 1 < Y N .x/ : This and the strict concavity of each v i implies t > 0: Thus, from (19) we obtain
The left side of this inequality is a convex combination of the terms X sC1 X s , and hence not more than the largest of them. We thus obtain
where
8 Lemma 2 only states that convergence is asymptotic if X > N Y : But its proof actually shows that convergence is asymptotic under the weaker condition that X > max i2N .x/ Y i .
Note that Q t is nondecreasing in t: Hence, if Q t 1; then Q s 1 for all s t: But then a recursive application of (20) would yield the contradiction X t ! 1: Hence, Q t < 1 for all large t: We now have
From this, (16) This, since each v In E z player i moves only at dates .nk C i/m; since in E x she moves only at dates nk C i: The path E z is feasible for E N by (CY), since i 2 N .nkCi/m :
Let 2 .0; 1/; and suppose E x is an equilibrium path of 0. ;
holds, Lemma 1 implies E z is an equilibrium path of 0. O ; E N / if it and O satisfy (6). So, letting t 1 and i 2 N ; it suf ces to show 
which we now show. The de nitions of E z and O imply
Because E x satis es (6) at date p; we have
The two previous displays, with u i .z
Lemma D1. Given (PD), suppose a pro le x is not weakly underblocked. Then, a neighborhood of x exists such that every O x in it that satis es O x < x is also not weakly underblocked.
Proof. As the lemma is trivially true for x D 0; we may suppose x > 0: Since x is not weakly underblocked and (PD) implies it is a satiation pro le, we have x 2 D by Lemma 6
.ii/. Hence, X Y N .x/ by Corollary 1. Assume the lemma is false. Then an in nite sequence fx k g exists such that x k ! x; x k < x; and each x k is weakly underblocked, say by a coalition S k using a pro le z k < x k : By taking a subsequence we may assume S k D S for all k (as the number of coalitions is nite), and fz k g converges to a pro le z (as each z k is in the compact S uses z k to weakly underblock x k ; u S .z k / u S .x k /: Summing these inequalities over S yields
This, the strict concavity of f S ; and
Proof of Proposition 4. By Lemma 8, it suf ces to prove the result for E N D E N R : Given (PD), the passive strategy pro le is an equilibrium, and so the origin is achievable. So suppose x > 0:
u.x/; since the concavity of each v i implies that for any 0; @u.
De ne fx t g 1 kD0 to be a round-robin sequence if for each t > 0 and i D t .mod n/; x t i D x t 1 i : The rest of the proof consists of three steps.
Step 1. There exists a nondecreasing round-robin sequence fx t g 1 tD0 ; and a discount factor 0 < 1; such that x 0 D N x; x t ! x; and for all t > 0; i D t .mod n/; and 0 : 
for all i 2 N : De ne fx t g 1 tD0 by x 0 :D N x and, for t > 0;
This fx t g 1 tD0 is a round-robin sequence that starts at N x and converges to x: Fix t > 0; and let i D t .mod n/: Let q 0 be the integer for which t D i C qn: At the end of period t 1; players j D 1; : : : ; i 1 have raised their actions q C 1 times, and players j D i; : : : ; n have raised theirs just q times. Hence, since x N x D N d;
This implies
Similarly, for any k 1;
and
Turning to the desired inequality (23), note that it is equivalent to
This expression can be bounded from below. From (27) and (29) we have
From this, 1 a k > a.1 a k 1 /; and 1 a k 1 > a.1 a k 1 /, we obtain
From (26) and (28) This and (24) imply
Therefore,
Thus, A 0 for 0 :D .1 C "/ 1=n : As 0 does not depend on t;
Step 1 is proved.
Step 2. There exists a nite, nonincreasing round-robin sequence fx k g Step 3. There exists < 1 and a path E x converging to x such that E x is an equilibrium path of 0. ; E N R / for > : So assume x is weakly underblocked, say by a coalition S using a pro le z: Then z < x; z S D 0; and u S .z/ u S .x/: Since x is a non-solo satiation pro le, Lemma B1 allows us to assume u S .z/ D u S .z/: Hence, u S .x/ u S .z/: Summing these inequalities over S yields
Thus, since Y S maximizes f S and f S .Y S / D V .S/;
Since X S X; (31) also implies f S .X / f S .Z /: Hence, since X > Z and f S is strictly concave,
This implies S 6 D N ; since X < Y N : The remainder of the proof depends on how Y was chosen. 
Now, since each v i is strictly concave, 2 .0; 1/; and O X 6 D X ; we have
This and (34) imply P i2S v i .X / X S > V .S/; contrary to (32). Hence, x must not be weakly underblocked. W . E N / is closed.
